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Abstract
I investigate a two-country non cooperative game where the sta-
tus quo ante is asymmetric as one country is endowed with nuclear
weapons while the other is not and is evaluating the opportunity of
build up a nuclear arsenal. After identifying the conditions on pay-
oﬀs such that the resulting reduced form is a coordination game with
two symmetric equilibria, I resort to forward induction to show that
the implicit signalling mechanism in it may lead countries to select
the peaceful equilibrium in a symmetric environment where both are
endowed with analogous arsenals.
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1 Introduction
May arms races have destabilising eﬀects, and ultimately bring about the
outbreak of war? This question has been - and still is - intensively debated in
the literature (see, e.g., Brito and Intriligator, 1984; Powell, 1987; Chassang
and Padro´ I Miquel, 2009). A related crucial aspect is the eﬀectiveness of
nuclear deterrence in preventing this outcome, whereby weapons are being
built precisely in order to prevent a war (see Powell, 1990; Wagner, 1991;
Zagare, 2004, inter alia). Consequently, while in line of principle there can be
a generalised agreement on the fact that a world without weapons is trivially
preferable to one where each country avails of a non negligible arsenal, the
appraisal of the balance between the pros and cons of taking part in an arms
race remains somewhat ambiguous.
Additionally, this may impose on countries a disproportionate cost. Ever
since Shubik’s dollar auction game (Shubik, 1971; see also O’Neill 1986 and
Leininger, 1989, inter alia) we know that playing games involving arms races
is a very harsh task in economic terms, as countries face the concrete possibil-
ity of excess investment, or even default. Consequently, a country may decide
never to engage in an arms race, although this involves the unpleasant con-
sequence of being put at a permanent disadvantage against other countries
that have instead chosen to undertake such enterprise.
Another way of approaching this matter consists in asking oneself whether
a scenario where all countries are endowed with considerable arsenals (typi-
cally including nuclear weapons) is more or less conducive to open conflicts
as compared to alternative situations where such weapons are totally absent
or very unevenly distributed across countries. Furthermore, is it correct to
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interpret a country’s eﬀort to put itself on equal footing with others already
endowed with strategic weapons as a necessarily hostile move? The objective
of this note is to examine this problem using the tool of forward induction
in an asymmetric game in which, at the outset, one country is a nuclear
power while the other is not, but is considering the possibility of acquiring a
nuclear arsenal of its own. It turns out that, if the game yields two symmet-
ric Nash equilibria posing a coordination problem that cannot be solved by
backward induction, invoking the forward induction argument indeed works
as an equilibrium selection tool, in such a way that an even endowment of
nuclear weapons drives countries to the peaceful equilibrium.
2 The game
To begin with, consider the following non cooperative game. Players are two
fully symmetric countries, labelled as 1 and 2. They are both nuclear powers,
and the game consists in deciding whether to strike or not. The two pure
strategies are a for to attack and na for not to attack. This is a one-shot
game taking place under imperfect, complete and symmetric information.
The corresponding 2× 2 strategic form is described by Matrix 1.
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a na
1 a w ; w f ; s
na s ; f p ; p
Matrix 1
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The payoﬀs appearing in the cells can be read as w =war, p =peace,
f =first and s =second, respectively. Asymmetric outcomes (a, na) and
(na, a) are to be interpreted as the reduced form of scenarios where one
country strikes first but the other is not altogether annihilated and there-
fore is in a position to retaliate, at least to some extent.1 The equilibrium
outcomes generated by the game of course depend on the relevant payoﬀ
ranking. To begin with, while it makes sense to assume that p > w, we may
say that if hawks (respectively, doves) are in control, then f > p (respec-
tively, p > f).2 Therefore, as in Lichbach (1990), we may ask ourselves what
kind of game these two countries are about to play. The overall appraisal of
Matrix 1 reveals the following:
• if w > s, i.e., a symmetric war is better than bearing the brunt of a first
strike, and p > f, then we have a coordination game along the main
diagonal, (a, a) and (na, na) being both Nash equilibrium outcomes. It
is worth stressing that the inequality p > f is compatible with a forward
looking attitude on the part of both players, if they are taking into
account the long term global (i.e., economic, climatic, demographic)
consequences of any - even limited - use of nuclear weapons;3
1For a similar structure, see Chassang and Padro´ I Miquel (2009). They focus, however,
on the potentially destabilising eﬀects of defensive shields, such as the Strategic Defense
Initiative carried out by the US under the Reagan administration.
2This aspect is particularly delicate and has ultimately to do with the preferences of
those in control of nuclear arsenals. A relevant example, in this respect, is the inclination
of General Curtis LeMay to interpret the mission of the Strategic Air Command as that
of performing an all-out attack at the very beginning of a war. This strategy was labelled
as the “Sunday punch”. For more on this, see Rhodes (1995).
3On this particular aspect, see Mills et al. (2008), inter alia.
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• if s > w and p > f, then the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in (na, na) , which is also Pareto-eﬃcient;
• if s > w and f > p, then we observe a chicken game with two pure-
strategy equilibria along the secondary diagonal, at (a, na) and (na, a) ;
• if w > s and f > p, then the game is a prisoners’ dilemma yield-
ing a unique and Pareto-ineﬃcient pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
correspondence of (a, a).
Whenever the game yields two pure strategy equilibria, the related co-
ordination problem hinders our capability of predicting the exact outcome
of the game; additionally, it prompts for the analysis of the mixed strategy
equilibrium and possibly also for the investigation of risk dominance. My
objective in the remainder of this note is instead to propose the use of for-
ward induction (see Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986; and van Damme, 1991) for
the specific case in which the game poses a coordination problem, the two
equilibria being (a, a) and (na, na) .
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Figure 1 The extensive form with an outside option
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To envisage a way out of the coordination issue, we can step back and
imagine an alternative situation where the outbreak of a nuclear conflict is
not plausible as country 2 is already a nuclear power, while country 1 is not,
but may decide to become one. If it does, there indeed arises the perspective
of a symmetric nuclear confrontation possibly leading to a war. Otherwise,
the status quo ante persists, with country 2 enjoying a dominant position
in the international scenario by virtue of its exclusive endowment of nuclear
weapons, and may extract a positional rent from this very fact.
Now observe the game tree in Figure 1. Country 1 has the option to
stay out of the nuke club (strategy o). If it does so, the resulting payoﬀs
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are πo2 > π
o
1, this inequality capturing the aforementioned positional rent.
Hence, should it decide to remain out of the club, country 1 would put itself
at disadvantage with respect to country 2, which might then be in a position
to impose humiliating decisions onto country 1. By entering instead the club
(strategy e), country 1 leads both players to a subgame with imperfect infor-
mation (although complete and symmetric) equivalent to the strategic form
described in Matrix 1. Matrix 2 illustrates the strategic form corresponding
to the tree.
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a na
ea w ; w f ; s
1 ena s ; f p ; p
o πo1 ; π
o
2 π
o
1 ; π
o
2
Matrix 2
For (a, a) and (na, na) to be the Nash equilibria of the imperfect informa-
tion subgame, it must be true that w > s and p > f. Additionally, remember
that I have also assumed p > w. Assume, further, that πo1 ∈ (max {w, f} , p)
and πo2 > p, the latter inequality being in agreement with the idea that hold-
ing monopoly power on nuclear weapons would put country 2 in a dominant
position in the international arena.
The principle of backward induction cannot help solve the imperfect in-
formation subgame that generates if country 1 chooses e. Instead, forward
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induction can be used to perform this task. According to the forward induc-
tion principle, each player - in order to forecast future developments , and
ultimately the equilibrium outcome, starting from any node of a sequential
play game - has to interpret correctly the reasons why the game has reached
that particular node and not others. To do this, every player has to figure
out the reasons behind the behaviour of any other players that moved at
previous nodes. This also entails that each player uses an implicit signalling
mechanism at every node, so as to transmit to others a rational hint about
what he/she expects to happen in the remainder of the game.
If indeed πo1 ∈ (max {w, f} , p) , by playing e country 1 signals that it
expects the game to produce the peaceful equilibrium (na, na) , and country
2 should understand this on the basis of forward induction. The same con-
clusion can be reached by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies in
Matrix 2. Examine first the strategic form from the standpoint of country 1:
given that πo1 > max {w, f} and w > s, strategy ea is strictly dominated by
strategy o, so that the second row can be deleted. This is known to country
2, that, on the resulting 2 × 2 matrix finds out that na weakly dominates
a since p > f. The last step consists in observing that along the remaining
2× 1 column is such that country 1 has in ena a dominant strategy. There-
fore, iterated dominance produces indeed to the same equilibrium outcome
as forward induction.
8
References
[1] Brito, D.L. and M.D. Intriligator (1984), “Can Arms Races Lead to the
Outbreak of War?”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28, 63-84.
[2] Chassang, S. and G. Padro´ I Miquel (2009), “Defensive Weapons and
Defensive Alliances”, American Economic Review, 99 (P&P), 282-86.
[3] Kohlberg, E. and J.-F. Mertens (1986), “On the Strategic Stability of
Equilibria”, Econometrica, 54, 1003-38.
[4] Leininger, W. (1989), “Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situa-
tions: The Dollar Auction Revisited”, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
33, 231-54.
[5] Lichbach, M.I. (1990), “When Is an Arms Rivalry a Prisoner’s Dilemma?
Richardson’s Models and 2× 2 Games”, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
34, 29-56.
[6] Mills, M.J., O.B. Toon, R.P. Turco, D.E. Kinnison and R.R. Garcia
(2008), “Massive Global Ozone Loss Predicted following Regional Nu-
clear Conflict”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105,
5307-12.
[7] O’Neill, B. (1986), “International Escalation and the Dollar Auction”,
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30, 33-50.
[8] Powell, R. (1987), “Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD”, American
Political Science Review, 81, 717-36.
9
[9] Powell, R. (1990), Nuclear Deterrence Theory. The Search for Credibil-
ity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
[10] Rhodes, R. (1995), Dark Sun. The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, New
York, Simon and Schuster.
[11] Shubik, M. (1971), “The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Nonco-
operative Behavior and Escalation”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15,
109-11.
[12] van Damme, E. (1991), Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Hei-
delberg, Springer-Verlag.
[13] Wagner, R.H. (1991), “Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and
the Incentive to Strike First”, American Political Science Review, 85,
727-49.
[14] Zagare, F. (2004), “Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence. A Re-
examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory”, Journal
of Theoretical Politics, 16, 107-41.
10
 
